By Foo Yun Chee
BRUSSELS (Reuters) – Amazon (NASDAQ:)’s proposal to halt sure on-line promoting and advertising practices in a bid to avert doable hefty EU antitrust fines must be rejected as a result of it’s weak and stuffed with loopholes, a gaggle of 11 non-governmental our bodies have advised EU regulators.
The criticism from the group, which incorporates LobbyControl, the Centre for Analysis on Multinational Firms (SOMO), the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour and the European Public Providers Union, echoed these from pan-European shopper group BEUC final week.
“They’re weak, obscure and stuffed with loopholes, leaving an excessive amount of room for evasion and abuse by Amazon. Furthermore, the proposed limitation of those commitments to 5 years, or certainly any time horizon in any respect, is unjustifiable,” the group stated in a press release.
Amazon didn’t instantly reply to a request for remark.
The NGO group urged the European Fee to pressure Amazon to separate its market from its retail and logistics operations with the intention to deal with considerations about its dominance and management over interrelated providers.
It stated the supply additionally falls wanting more durable necessities imposed on digital gatekeepers below landmark tech guidelines that may go into impact subsequent yr.
Amazon ought to agree to not entry sellers’ knowledge and never simply to cease utilizing it whereas the effectiveness of a second purchase field on its web site must be examined by unbiased researchers, BEUC authorized and financial affairs director Agustin Reyna advised Reuters.
The Fee had given third events till Sept. 9 to offer suggestions to Amazon’s supply which features a pledge to chorus from utilizing sellers’ knowledge for its personal competing retail enterprise and its non-public label merchandise.
The U.S. on-line retail large stated it would deal with sellers equally when rating their gives for the “purchase field” on its web site that generates the majority of its gross sales.
It should additionally arrange a second purchase field for a rival product if it differs considerably in value and supply from the product within the first field.
